#### Political economics 2021

**Uppsala University** 

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Guest lecturers: Mounir Karadja, Linna Martén, Torben Mideksa

#### Course program (updated 19/8/21)

#### 1. Background and social choice

- a. Introduction
- b. Condorcet's voting paradox
- c. Arrows' impossibility theorem
- d. Median voter theorem
- e. Intensity of preferences

### 2. Voting

- a. Voting rules
- b. Condorcet jury Theorem
- c. Why do people vote?
- d. Strategic voting

### 3. Electoral Competition I – Deterministic Voting

- a. A simple model of public finance
- b. Median voter model with parties
- c. Empirical evidence on policy convergence
- d. An application of the median voter model: The growth of government

#### 4. Electoral Competition II – Probabilistic Voting

- a. Probabilistic voting models
- b. Empirical evidence: an application to intergovernmental grants
- c. An application to campaigning

## 5. Electoral Competition III - The Citizen-Candidate Model

- a. Politicians with policy views
- b. Citizen-candidate models
- c. Empirical evidence
- d. Legislative bargaining models

## 6. Agency models

- a. Political competition with rents
- b. A simple agency model
- c. Politician's traits

## 7. Lobbying and campaigning

a. Special interest groups

- b. Lobbying and campaigning
  - i. Quid pro quo models vs. informational models: evidence
- c. Political ties

## 8. Political budget cycles

- a. A simple probabilistic voting model of budget cycles
- b. Empirical evidence

# 9. Voters and politicians' information

- a. The effect of information campaign on voting outcomes
- b. Effects on politicians
- c. Canvassing

# 10. The labor market of politicians

- a. Motives for holding office
- b. Evidence of wages and political selection

# 11. Populism

- a. What is populism?
- b. The recent rise of populist parties
- c. Evidence on determinants of populism

## 12. Immigration and political economy (Linna Martén)

## 13. Political Economy of International Climate Policies (Torben Mideksa)

- a. Cooperatively optimal policies
- b. Non-cooperatively chosen policies and sources of global inefficiencies
- c. The role of international union's such as the EU in reducing inefficiencies
- d. The role of international climate agreements

#### 14. Institutions (Mounir Karadja)

- a. State Capacity
- b. Inclusive and extractive institutions
- c. Culture and institutions