Political economics 2020

Uppsala University

Main teacher: Luca Repetto

Teaching assistant: Daniel Klug Nogueira
Guest lecturers: Mounir Karadja, Linna Martén, Torben Mideksa

PLAN OF LECTURES (updated 30/11/20)

1. **Background and social choice**
   a. Introduction
   b. Condorcet's voting paradox
   c. Arrows' impossibility theorem
   d. Median voter theorem
   e. Intensity of preferences

2. **Voting**
   a. Voting rules
   b. Condorcet jury Theorem
   c. Why do people vote?
   d. Strategic voting

3. **Electoral Competition I – Deterministic Voting**
   a. A simple model of public finance
   b. Median voter model with parties
   c. Empirical evidence on policy convergence
   d. An application of the median voter model: The growth of government

4. **Electoral Competition II – Probabilistic Voting**
   a. Probabilistic voting models
   b. Empirical evidence: an application to intergovernmental grants
   c. An application to campaigning

5. **Electoral Competition III – The Citizen-Candidate Model**
   a. Politicians with policy views
   b. Citizen-candidate models
   c. Empirical evidence
   d. Legislative bargaining models

6. **Agency models**
   a. Political competition with rents
   b. A simple agency model
   c. Politician's traits

7. **Lobbying and campaigning**
   a. Special interest groups

        b.   Lobbying and campaigning
             i.   Quid pro quo models vs. informational models: evidence
        c.   Political ties

8. Political budget cycles
        a.   A simple probabilistic voting model of budget cycles
        b.   Empirical evidence

9. Voters and politicians' information
        a.   The effect of information campaign on voting outcomes
        b.   Effects on politicians
        c.   Canvassing

10. The labor market of politicians
        a.   Motives for holding office
        b.   Evidence of wages and political selection

11. Populism
        a.   What is populism?
        b.   The recent rise of populist parties
        c.   Evidence on determinants of populism

12. Immigration and political economy (Linna Martén)

13. Political Economy of International Climate Policies (Torben Mideksa)
        a.   Cooperatively optimal policies
        b.   Non-cooperatively chosen policies and sources of global inefficiencies
        c.   The role of international union's such as the EU in reducing inefficiencies
        d.   The role of international climate agreements

14. Institutions I (Mounir Karadja)
        a.   State Capacity
        b.   Inclusive and extractive institutions
        c.   Culture and institutions

15. Institutions II (Mounir Karadja)
        a.   Origins of institutions
        b.   Institutional change