


# Figures and Tables

This file collects all figures and table appearing in the paper:

Carozzi, Felipe, and Luca Repetto. "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities." *Journal of Public Economics* 134 (2016): 42-52.

## Figures



*Notes:* These graphs plot the yearly evolution of transfers received by municipalities gaining (left panel) or losing (central panel) an *external* connection. We label the year after an election (1997 and 2002) as zero. Municipalities not gaining any connection are also reported in the rightmost panel for comparison. Transfers per capita are in Euros (after removing year effects and adding the estimated constant term to all coefficients). Means before and after elections are represented as dashed horizontal lines.

## Tables

TABLE 1  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MUNICIPALITIES AND PARLIAMENTARIANS

	1994-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	
<b>Panel A: Municipalities</b>				
Population	6944.1 (29510.7)	6963.6 (28855.8)	7058.3 (28429.5)	
Transfers p.c.	226.8 (249.1)	208.7 (124.3)	248.2 (129.5)	
Surface (km2)	41.5 (274.9)	43.6 (315.5)	44.3 (318.9)	
Pop. density	283.8 (642.1)	287.6 (641.3)	294.8 (646.9)	
Municipalities with at least 1 repr (%)	6.5 (24.7)	6.4 (24.5)	6.3 (24.2)	
Observations	7467	7467	7463	
	<b>Internals</b>	<b>Externals</b>	<b>Prop.</b>	<b>Int-ext</b>
<b>Panel B: Parliamentarians</b>				
Age	49.8 9.2	50.8 9.9	50.5 9.5	-1.0 0.4
Male (%)	92.6 26.1	90.4 29.4	80.6 39.6	2.2 1.2
College or higher (%)	69.4 46.1	71.0 45.4	71.3 45.3	-1.7 2.0
Income (thousand Euros)	114.2 249.7	119.7 150.3	113.2 158.7	-5.5 8.9
Previous exp. in the Parliament (years)	2.6 4.4	3.2 5.1	3.3 5.5	-0.6 0.2
Previous exp. in the Government	5.5 22.9	7.3 26.1	11.0 31.3	-1.8 1.1
Previous exp. at the province level	13.6 34.3	10.4 30.5	9.6 29.5	3.3 1.4
Previous exp. as mayor	18.0 38.4	8.9 28.5	10.5 30.7	9.0 1.5
Previous exp. as national party member	17.6 38.1	26.1 43.9	24.3 42.9	-8.5 1.8
Previous exp. as local party member	29.3 45.5	24.5 43.0	26.6 44.2	4.8 1.9
Observations	996	1122	704	2118

TABLE 2  
BASELINE RESULTS

	OLS	Within-groups		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.
Ext. connect	10.4*** (3.43)	5.59*** (2.17)	4.81** (2.20)	3.99** (1.95)
Int. connect	4.46 (2.93)	-1.19 (2.47)	-0.90 (2.59)	-0.15 (2.27)
Prop. connect	6.28* (3.79)	4.57 (3.00)	4.28 (3.05)	3.32 (2.79)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year effects	Y	N	Y	Y
Region effects	Y	N	N	N
Region-year effects	N	N	N	Y
Municipality effects	N	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	0.39	0.64	0.66	0.67
Observations	89203	89203	89203	89203

*Notes:* The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per capita. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE 3  
SPENDING CYCLE RESULTS

	(1) Transfers p.c.	(2) Transfers p.c.	(3) Transfers p.c.
Int.*first year	3.18 (2.09)		2.04 (2.02)
Ext.*first year	3.20 (2.60)		1.91 (2.52)
Prop.*first year	1.45 (3.07)		0.39 (3.10)
Ext. connect	3.15* (1.66)	4.99** (2.06)	4.40** (1.71)
Int. connect	-1.06 (2.02)	0.69 (2.34)	0.024 (2.04)
Prop. connect	2.86 (2.36)	4.01 (2.93)	3.86 (2.49)
Int*last year		-6.07*** (1.35)	-5.46*** (1.07)
Ext*last year		-6.53*** (1.51)	-5.97*** (1.12)
Prop.*last year		-5.19*** (1.92)	-5.06*** (1.76)
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Year effects	Y	Y	Y
Region effects	N	N	N
Region-year effects	Y	Y	Y
Municipality effects	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.67	0.67	0.67
Observations	89203	89203	89203

*Notes:* The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per capita. *First year* is an indicator for being in the first year of the legislature (1994, 1996 and 2001), whereas *last year* is an indicator for being in the last year (2000 and 2005). All specifications include municipality and year-region fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

TABLE 4  
LOCALNESS OF POLITICIANS

<b>Panel A: Internals, externals and bills</b>			
	<b>Internals</b>	<b>Externals</b>	<b>Ext - int</b>
# all bills	10.85	10.68	-0.17 [1.28]
# regional bills (all regions)	1.58	1.01	-0.57*** [0.20]
<i>of which:</i>			
% bills to region of election	84.49	65.40	-19.10*** [4.54]
% bills to region of birth	84.49	12.25	-72.24*** [4.09]
Observations	371	156	
<b>Panel B: Test if externals disproportionally target birthplace</b>			
			<i>p-value</i>
Unweighted			0.026**
Population Weighted			0.097*

*Notes:* Private member bills sponsored by members of the *Camera* who sponsored at least one bill. 1996 and 2001 legislatures only. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. In panel B we report p-values for mean comparison tests for the share of regional bills sponsored by externals that are directed to their region of birth (12.25%). In the *Unweighted* line we report the p-value of a *t*-test of the null that this number is statistically different from 5%. In the *Population weighted* line, instead, we compare the share of birth region bills with the share of Italian population living in that region, and test the null that the difference between the two is zero.

TABLE 5  
DISTRICT-LEVEL ANALYSIS

	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.
<b>Panel A: Camera</b>				
Ext. connect	-24.3*** (4.69)	-12.7*** (3.29)	-12.6*** (3.35)	-0.90 (2.00)
$R^2$	0.11	0.51	0.57	0.83
Observations	4368	4368	4368	4368
<b>Panel B: Senato</b>				
Ext. connect	-26.8*** (5.43)	-7.57** (3.72)	-8.18** (3.88)	2.33 (3.11)
$R^2$	0.18	0.63	0.70	0.88
Observations	2244	2244	2244	2244
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region effects	N	Y	N	N
Region-year effects	N	N	Y	N
Constituency effects	N	N	N	Y

*Notes:* The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per capita, aggregated at the district level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the district level.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE 6  
MECHANISMS

	Post-congress	Aligned party	Same surname	All variables
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.	Transfers p.c.
Ext. connect	4.09* (2.32)	4.71** (1.96)	4.55** (2.23)	3.89* (2.04)
Int. connect	-1.03 (2.86)	-3.44 (2.55)	-0.94 (2.72)	-3.27 (2.97)
Prop. connect	4.93 (3.82)	5.18 (3.67)	4.39 (3.12)	5.60 (4.32)
Ext.*Posterior exp.	11.8* (6.80)			11.7* (7.02)
Int.*Posterior exp.	0.11 (4.45)			0.13 (4.53)
Prop.*Posterior exp.	-5.74 (10.27)			-4.49 (9.52)
Ext.*Aligned Party		1.28 (8.66)		1.44 (8.51)
Int.*Aligned Party		15.5*** (5.78)		15.9*** (5.84)
Prop.*Aligned Party		-7.63 (7.94)		-7.25 (7.67)
Ext.*Same Surname			8.85 (6.96)	4.08 (7.68)
Int.*Same Surname			0.19 (4.50)	-3.70 (4.89)
Prop.*Same Surname			-1.80 (6.90)	0.94 (6.80)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region-year effects	N	N	N	N
Municipality effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Observations	89203	89203	89203	89203

Notes: The dependent variable is transfers from the central government in 2005 Euros per capita. The variable *Posterior exp* is a dummy equal to one if municipality *i* is the birth town of at least one parliamentarian in office in  $t-1$  that pursued a career there after leaving Parliament. For each type of connection (*Internal*, *External* or *Proportional*), the interaction with the *Aligned Party* is one when municipality *i* has at least one connection in year  $t-1$  belonging to the same party as the mayor in office. The variable *Same surname* is one if the municipality is the birth town of a member of the Parliament in office that has the same surname as the current mayor. All specifications include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE 7  
PLACEBOS

	(1) Transfers p.c.	(2) Transfers p.c.	(3) Mortg. tr. p.c.	(4) Ordinary tr. p.c.
False ext. connect	-1.77 (1.99)			
False int. connect	-0.64 (1.51)			
Reg. connect		0.34 (1.28)		
Ext. connect			-0.32 (0.80)	1.30 (1.41)
Int. connect			-0.048 (0.68)	0.033 (1.37)
Prop. connect			-0.54 (0.83)	2.19 (1.79)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region effects	N	N	N	N
Region-year effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Municipality effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	0.67	0.67	0.86	0.95
Observations	89203	89203	83889	89183

*Notes:* The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is transfers from the central government. In column 3 the dependent variable is transfers for past mortgages, whereas in column 4 we use ordinary tranfers. All quantities are in 2005 Euros per capita. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .